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Abstract
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The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States aims to create a free 
trade zone for economic development. The Agreement is 
expected to intensify commerce and investment among 
the participating countries. This paper analyzes the 
changes in the production and trading patterns in 2-digit 
manufacturing sectors with the goal of understanding the 
short-term environmental implications of the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement. 
More specifically, the paper addresses the questions: 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit,  Latin America and the Caribbean 
Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at bcunha@worldbank.org and mmani@worldbank.org.  
Did pollution increase in the period after the Agreement 
negotiations? Did trade and production shift toward 
pollution intensive factors? The results suggest an increase 
in pollution emissions in the post-negotiations period. 
The increase in emissions is mainly attributable to scale 
effects. Composition effects are small and in some cases 
(including Nicaragua and Honduras) favoring cleaner 
industries and partially compensating the pollution gains 
from output and export growth.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The seminal work of Grossman and Krueger (1992) ignited a debate on the impact of international trade 
on the environment. Originally fueled by negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),  the  debate  remains  relevant  as  new  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  are  formed  and 
environmental concerns continue to rise. This paper contributes to this recent literature by assessing the 
environmental implications of trade, specifically the pollution effects of the changes in production and 
trading patterns that followed the Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States (DR-CAFTA). 
 
The  DR-CAFTA  promotes  commercial  and  financial  integration  among  member  countries.  The 
agreement, passed by the US Congress on July 28, 2005, encompasses the United States and the Central 
American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and the Dominican 
Republic.  DR-CAFTA’s  main  goal  is  to  create  a  free-trade  and  investment  zone  for  economic 
development,  and  includes  several  measures  to  regulate  investment  activities  and  to  facilitate  the 
exchange of goods and services. The Agreement has a complementary policy agenda addressing local 
competitiveness,  property  rights,  labor,  and  environmental  issues.  On  the  environmental  side,  the 
Agreement emphasizes the monitoring and implementation of  current environmental laws, but unlike 
NAFTA it pays less attention to the strengthening and harmonizing of unequal environmental standards 
among member countries. 
 
The literature on trade and the environment discusses various channels through which trade liberalization 
(and trade agreements) can affect pollution emissions. On the one hand, empirical evidence indicates that 
trade  liberalization  can  stimulate  economic  growth.  Scaling  up  (holding  constant  the  mix  of  goods 
produced and production techniques) leads to an increase in pollution (scale effects). On the other hand, 
trade liberalization changes relative prices by intensifying foreign competition. As a result, the structure 
of  production  is  expected  to  change  according  to  relative  comparative  advantages—defined  by  both 
factors of production and institutional arrangements. This effect can either increase or decrease relative 
output in pollution-intensive sectors (composition effects). Finally, changes in production technologies 
(including pollution intensity by unit of output) tend to follow trade liberalization (technique effects). 
Technique effects can result from different forces: while trade facilitates the access to more efficient (and 
cleaner) technologies, stronger competition can trigger a race to the bottom of environmental standards, 
favoring the adoption of cheaper and dirtier technology in the short run. Nevertheless, as income grows, 
the demand for environmental quality tends to increase. By adopting both tighter environment policies 
and more advanced, cleaner technologies, countries can afford to reduce emissions after reaching a certain 




Previous empirical studies on the relationship between trade and the environment  have found varying 
results. For example,  Dean (2002) uses  province-level data on water pollution from China and f inds 
support for the idea that trade liberalization has both a  direct and an indirect effect on emissions growth 
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and  that  these  can  be  opposite  in  sign.  In  contrast,  Grossman  and  Krueger  (1992)  examine  the 
environmental impacts of NAFTA and find no evidence that a comparative advantage is being created by 
lax environmental regulations in Mexico. Using data for different countries from 1960 to 1995, Mani and 
Wheeler (1998) find that ―pollution haven effects‖ are insignificant in developing countries. In a closely 
related  study,  Gamper-Rabindran  and  Jha  (2004)  analyze  the  empirical  relationship  between  trade 
liberalization and the environment in the Indian context. Their findings indicate that exports and foreign 
direct investment grew in the more polluting sectors relative to the less polluting sectors between the pre- 
and  post-liberalization  periods.  This  evidence  provides  some  support  for  concerns  raised  about  the 
environmental impact of trade liberalization. 
 
This paper builds on this literature by assessing the pollution effects related to implementation of the DR-
CAFTA.  It  starts  by  revisiting  the  related  literature  and  discussing  the  possible  implications  of  the 
agreement for Central America environmental conditions in the short and medium term. It then computes 
the scale, composition, and technique effects of pollution by comparing average annual emissions before 
and after implementation of the agreement
3. The analysis shows, as often found in the literature, that the 
scale effects outweigh the composition and technique effects. Most of the variation in pollution results 
from a scaling up of production. Composition effects are small and vary in sign across member countries. 
This result suggests that environmental regulation  in most DR-CAFTA countries is not a major factor 
influencing  pollution  dynamics. This idea is also supported by   the  findings of the second   empirical 
exercise. The second part of the analysis  investigates whether the sectoral changes in production and 
exports that followed the DR-CAFTA favored pollution-intensive (―dirty‖) industries. Consistent with the 
results of the first exercise, this analysis indicates that the period following negotiation of the agreement 
is associated with a slowdown in the relative growth and export of pollution-intensive industries. 
 
The  results  indicate  that  all  countries  could  benefit  from  closing  the  gaps  in  their  environmental 
regulatory framework in terms of regulations, capacity, and monitoring. Countries such as El Salvador, 
where the agreement favored the relative expansion of more-polluting industries, should go beyond the 
DR-CAFTA environmental agenda and work on strengthening regulations in the short run. However, 
environmental  reforms  should  be  accompanied  by  a  competitiveness  agenda  (including  reforms  to 
facilitate training, access to credit, and logistics) that would help to compensate for the costs imposed by 
the additional rigidity in the environmental laws. For poorer countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras, 
environmental regulations do not seem to play an important role in the current allocation of production. 
Nevertheless, as these economies grow, the situation will change. For this reason, these countries should 
start planning and implementing a medium-term environmental agenda. 
 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  reviews  the  recent  environmental 
development is Central America. Section II revisit the trade and environment literature and discusses the 
potential implication of the DR-CAFTA. Section IV outlines the basic exercise and presents the data, 
while Section V presents the results of the analysis. A final section concludes with a discussion of the 
results and their implications. 
 
II.  DR-CAFTA and the Environment 
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results in the literature. 4 
 
 
The  main  goal  of  DR-CAFTA  was  to  create  a  free  trade  zone  for  economic  development,  regulate 
investment activities, and facilitate the trade of goods and services. The agreement has a complementary 
policy agenda addressing local competitiveness, property rights, labor, and environmental issues. Chapter 
10 and specifically chapter 17 of the agreement outline the rules, regulations, and other provisions for 
addressing environmental issues. Under chapter 17, each party shall, among other things, (a) ensure that 
its laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental protection; (b) not fail to 
effectively  enforce  its  current  environmental  laws;  (c)  ensure  that  judicial,  quasi-judicial,  or 
administrative proceedings are available to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws, that 
such  proceedings  are  fair,  equitable  and  transparent,  and  that  tribunals  that  conduct  or  review  such 
proceedings are impartial and independent; (d) provide appropriate and effective remedies or sanctions 
for a violation of environmental laws; (e) ensure that interested persons have the right to request a party’s 
competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws; and (f) encourage the 
development and use of incentives and other flexible and voluntary mechanisms to protect or enhance the 
environment. 
 
In support of these obligations, the parties entered into a separate Environmental Cooperation Agreement 
to protect, improve, and conserve the environment, including natural resources. The agreement establishes 
the  creation  of  a  Dominican  Republic–Central  America–United  States  Environmental  Cooperation 
Commission  composed  of  government  representatives  appointed  by  each  party.  The  commission  is 
responsible for  identifying  priorities  for  cooperative  activities  and  developing  a  program  of  work  in 
accordance  with  those  priorities.  It  also  examines  and  evaluates  the  cooperative  activities  under  the 
agreement and recommends ways to improve future cooperation. In addition, the  U.S. administration 
agreed to commit roughly US$40 million a year from fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2009 to help countries to 
implement labor and environmental provisions. By the end of 2010, a total of $38.8 million has been 
allocated to strengthen the capacity of members to comply with the environmental provisions of DR-
CAFTA and to build environmental capacity linked directly to trade in broad program areas, including 
DR- CAFTA specific obligations. 
 
Under DR-CAFTA, countries are mainly required to enforce their existing laws. Although the provision 
prevents a race to the bottom among member countries, there is no explicit requirement for strengthening 
existing regulatory frameworks. In addition, critics of the agreement point to the existence of loopholes in 
that provision: ―Although DR-CAFTA establishes a citizen submission process to allege enforcement 
failures, it does not provide for any clear outcomes or actions to actually ensure that citizens of the region 
can achieve enforcement of environmental laws‖ (Sarkar 2009). Finally, existing environmental laws vary 
significantly across member countries. Table 1 compares the ranking of select environmental regulatory 
regimes  during  the  DR-CAFTA  negotiation  period  (following  Esty  and  Porter  2005).  While  the 
environmental regimes of the United States and Costa Rica score above the international average, those of 
Guatemala and Honduras score among the bottom five. These differences could potentially favor the rise 
of pollution havens within the region. 
 
Given the new challenges following the signing of DR-CAFTA, we review the regulatory environmental 
frameworks of countries to underline the differences among them. While Costa Rica has been a regional 
leader on environmental issues, ensuring that economic growth is not achieved at the expense of its rich 5 
 
natural endowments, El Salvador faces the most severe environmental degradation of any country in 
Central America, especially in the areas of forests and water resources. Although the countries in the 
Region  have  achieved  some  progress  in  the  governance  of  natural  resources  and  environmental 
protection, more effort has to be made in order to even out the still largely uneven regulatory frameworks, 
especially  with respect  to  pollution  and  emissions control.    Box  1 reviews the  recent environmental 
developments in the four Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
 
 
Table 1:Environmental Regulatory Regime Index 
Rank 
*  Country  Index 
1  Finland   2.303 
14  US  1.184 
36  Costa Rica  -0.078 
60  Dominican Republic  -1.014 
62  Nicaragua  -1.164 
63  El Salvador  -1.215 
66  Honduras  -1.300 
69  Guatemala  -1.532 
*Out of 71 countries       Source: Esty and Porter (2005)     
 














































Box 1. Regulatory and Institutional Framework 
 
1.  Costa Rica 
 
Before the DR- CAFTA: Costa Rica has achieved significant progress in the development of institutions and organizations 
since 1991. In 1995 the country passed a new General Environmental Law and created the Ministry of the Environment and 
Energy. The Act established air as a common property and grants the state authority to protect the environment and prevent 
and  control  pollution.  It  sets  up  guidelines,  coordination  mechanisms  and  the  legal  framework  for  the  sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources and for the protection of the environment. As an example, the law created the National and 
Regional Environmental Councils, National Technical Secretariat for the Environment, the Administrative Environmental 
Tribunal or the Environmental Comptroller's Office. Since then, a large number of institutions have been created in specific 
areas related to environment and climate change, the Forestry Act in 1996 Establishes the state functions to ensure the 
conservation, protection and proper management of forests, as well as the production, use and industrialization of forest 
resources, the Biodiversity Act and the Land Use Management and Conservation Act (1998), the Environmental Services 
Payment in 2000 established the FONAFIFO (National Fund for Forestry Financing) to pay for environmental services 
rendered by forests and plantations, with funding from public and private institutions and it also set maximum payments for 
reforestation and protection management plans. 
 
After the DR- CAFTA: The environment program in Costa Rica is particularly ambitious and is one of the most developed 
among emerging countries. The government aims to become carbon-neutral by 2021, although it still faces caveats related to 
the increase in the energy costs and in the pressure of the population. Costa Rica should keep making efforts in fighting 
deforestation, lost  of  biodiversity  and  desertification,  meanwhile  environmental  institutions might  strength  controls  and 
evaluations.  
 
2.  El Salvador 
 
Before DR-CAFTA: El Salvador has made substantial progress in building its institutional capacity to address environmental and 
natural resource problems. In 1998 the country passed a new Environmental Law (LMA) and created the Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources. The LMA is the cornerstone of the country’s system of law and regulations in environment 
and it entrusts the Council of Ministers with the country’s environmental policy. In 2000 the Council established the Política 
Nacional  del  Medio  Ambiente  y  Lineamientos  Estrátegicos  which  is  based  on  three  overarching  principles:  Dynamic 
Equilibrium, Shared Responsibility and Social Interest. The LMA sets out the roles and enforcement powers of the Ministry of 
Environment  and  Natural  Resources  (MARN),  the  National  Environmental  Management  System  (SINAMA)  and  other 
government institutions. The main tool of the LMA is a permitting system that requires Environmental Impact Assessments 
for new projects. Besides the LMA, the government passed the Conservation of Wildlife Law (1999) and the Forestry Law 
(2002).  Under  the  LMA  the  country  strengthened  social  participation  by  passing  a  law  on  access  to  information  and 
introducing a system to collect and manage environmental complaints; and promoted environmental education by introducing 
environmental issues in programs and courses at all levels of the National Education System. 
 
After DR-CAFTA: In 2004 the government launched a national development plan (Safe Country 2004-2009) to enhance growth 
under the assumption of CAFTA adoption. It included the new environmental strategy of the government under the chapter 
called ―Environment: Legacy for Future Generations‖, with three main pillars: Natural Resources Conservation, Integrated 
Management  of  Water  Resources  and  Integrated  Management  of  Solid  Wastes.  The  government  created  the  National 
Environment Commission (CONAMA) as a consultative body for the MARN and an Executive Environmental Committee 
to ensure that CONAMA directives are followed. In 2005 the government passed the fourth and last environmental laws, the 
Natural Protected  Law.  Since  then,  the  government  has created  an  Inspectoría  Ambiental,  a  land development  plan  to 
prevent and manage environmental risk and degradation. The MARN has developed sector agreements. To strength the 
institutional capacity and to improve the environmental framework, the MARN and SINAMA have been under continuing 










































Despite this large list of accomplishments, there are apparent weaknesses in several areas with regard to 
the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental and natural resource management policies, as pointed 
out by Sarkar (2009). Areas of weakness include environmental information, environmental quality, and 
institutional  performance;  coordination  between  environmental  authorities  and  other  sector  agencies; 
regulatory instruments; and compliance, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
 
3.  Honduras 
 
Before DR-CAFTA: Honduras has developed a number of institutions and organizations to manage natural resources and 
protect  the  environment,  including  the  1993  General  Law  for  the  Environment.  This  law  establishes  that  protecting, 
conserving,  and  managing  the  environment  and  natural  resources  is  a  matter  of  public  interest  and  that  the  national 
government and municipalities must promote rational use and sustainable management of these resources In 1996, during 
the government modernization process, Environment Secretariat and the Natural Resources Secretariat were merged into a 
single  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Secretariat  (SERNA).  Honduras  has  signed  more  than  60  international 
environmental conventions, protocols, and treaties addressing regional and global. 
 
After DR-CAFTA: The country’s legal and regulatory frameworks have been strengthened to address, among other issues: 
management of water resources, protected areas, and forests; land use planning; pollution prevention; environmental health; 
and rural development. Recently issued national policies related to the environment include: Honduras Environmental Policy 
(2005); Agriculture and Rural Environment, which contains sections on Forestry and Productive Development, Forestry and 
Community  Development,  and  Forestry  and  Biodiversity  (2004);  Action  Plan  for  a  Sustainable  Energy  Policy  (2005); 
Environmental  Mainstreaming  (2005);  and  Simplification  and  Decentralization  of  Environmental  Management,  which 
included licensing (2002). Forest and Protect Area Act is under discussion in third debate, reforms of the National law on 
mines, law on incentives for the use of renewable energy, and the legislation on water resources are planned in the actual 
congress.  In addition, the National System of Environmental Information (SINIA), created in 1993, is responsible  for 
developing databases, websites, geographic information systems, remote sensing, and indicators.  
 
4.  Nicaragua 
 
Before DR-CAFTA: In 1994 the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARENA) was created to accomplish 
the formulation, coordination and enforcement of environmental policy. Two years later the government passed the General 
Law  on  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  which  became  the  cornerstone  of  the  environmental  legal  and  regulatory 
framework. It is in charge of administering the National Protected Areas System, administering Environmental Impact 
Assessment  (EIA),  coordinating  the  National  Environmental  Information  System  (SINIA)  and  coordinating  disaster 
prevention  and  response  measures  jointly  with  the  National  System  for  Disaster  Prevention,  Mitigation  and  Response 
(SINAPRED).  Two  regional  environmental  agencies  (SERNA)  were  building  to  be  in  charge  of  environmental  policy 
functions in the north and south Atlantic regions. Since MERNA was established the government has passed the Law on 
Exploration of Geothermal Resources in 2002 and one year later the Law on the Promotion of Hydropower and on Citizen 
Participation. 
 
After DR-CAFTA: In 2006 the government passed the Law on Forest Felling Ban. Related to the water legislation, in 2007 
the National Council on Potable Water and Sanitation (CONAPAS) approved a 10 year comprehensive sector strategy for 
the country's water and in 2008 the National Water Law was passed by the government. The Ministry of Natural Resources 
(MARENA) has developed environmental policies in eleven areas: conservation of water sources, pastures, productive use 
of water, protected areas, sustainable forestry, national reforestation campaign, sustainable land management, control and 
reduction  of  contamination,  solid  waste  management,  mitigation  and  adaptation  to  climate  change,  and  environmental 
education. Recent acceptance of Nicaragua in the pilot group of countries for financing activities to reduce deforestation 
through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a major opportunity to enhance the policies and mechanisms for 





Increased  trade  can  lead  to  different  kinds  of  environmental  pressures.  Trade-related  production 
specialization, linked to the reallocation of  productive resources, can create additional environmental 
pressures. One of the main environmental problems faced by Central American countries, not addressed 
in this study, is deforestation. Future research on the topic should take into account differences in the 
scope of and compliance with deforestation laws, for example, in Costa Rica and Honduras, because the 
expansion of agricultural frontiers in less protected countries could have a role in deteriorating watersheds 
and  decreasing  biodiversity.  Although  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  climate  change  also  could 
exacerbate existing conditions in some countries. 
 
 
III.  Trade and the Environment: A Review of the Literature 
 
A few concerns are frequently present in the debate over trade liberalization and environmental policy. 
First, there is concern that reducing barriers to trade could reinforce the creation of pollution havens. In 
places with weak environmental policies, trade liberalization may shift the composition of production and 
exports to more pollution- or resource-intensive sectors. Second, trade liberalization may directly affect 
environmental standards by encouraging a race to the bottom. While the risks of a race to the bottom in 
environmental  standards  are  reduced  by  the  environmental  clauses  in  the  DR-CAFTA,  regulatory 
differences between countries could potentially play a role in the production and export of pollution-
intensive commodities.  
 
The political debate has been followed by an effort in the economic literature to search for theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical evidence to justify such concerns. On the theoretical side, works can be 
divided into two main groups. The first group focuses on the direct relationship between trade and the 
environment, and most works extend the traditional trade framework to account for pollution modeled as 
an input or a second output of production (Copeland and Taylor 1994; Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 
2001; Péridy 2006; Di Maria and Smulders 2004). The second group focuses on an indirect relationship 
between  trade  and  pollution,  in  particular,  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  (facilitated  by 
international trade, among other things) and pollution (Stokey1998; Copeland and Taylor 2003). On the 
empirical  side,  many  papers  attempt  to  assess  the  relationship  between  trade,  growth,  and  the 
environment. While early works  focus on testing the pollution  havens hypothesis, later works try to 
disentangle the channels through which these variables interact (Cole and Rayner 2000; Grether, Mathys, 
and de Melo 2009). Copeland and Taylor (2004) provide a comprehensive review of both theoretical and 
empirical work on the topic. This section focuses on select study that will serve as base for assessing the 
expected effects of the trade agreement on pollution in Central America.  
 
Copeland and Taylor (1994), in what is considered a seminal work in the trade and environment literature, 
develop a two-country static general equilibrium model of international trade to explain the pollution 
haven hypothesis. The authors focus on how differences in human capital across countries affect their 
income, regulation, trade flows, and pollution levels. Large differences in human capital across regions 
ensure that each country specializes in a set of either relatively clean or dirty goods in trade. The intuition 
for these results is fairly clear. Trade alters the composition of output in both countries with high and 
countries with low human capital because of differences in the stringency of their pollution regulations. 
Given the relative cost structure in autarky, a movement toward free trade shifts the production of dirty 9 
 
goods  to  the  country  with  lax  regulation  and  the  production  of  clean  goods  to  the  one  with  strict 
regulation. However, the authors pay little attention to other factors that influence trade patterns and the 
environmental effects resulting from them. For example, a simple factor endowment hypothesis suggests 
that dirty capital-intensive processes should relocate to relatively capital abundant developed countries. 
 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) extend the previous framework to account for variables such as 
factor costs and endowments and technological changes. The theoretical framework supports a model 
based decomposition of the trade effect on emissions into scale, composition, and technique effects. Scale 
effect relates to the scaling up (holding constant the mix of goods produced and production techniques) of 
economic  activity  and inevitably  leads  to  an  increase  in  pollution  emissions.  The  composition  effect 
measures the change in pollution resulting from changes in the production structure (all else equal). These 
changes depend on the country’s comparative advantages – defined by both factors of production and 
institutional arrangements. Finally, the technique effects assess the changes in production technologies 
(including the pollution intensity by unit of output) that follow trade liberalization. Technique effects 
have  no  clear  sign  and  it  can  result  from  different  forces. 
4.  According to their  model, while trade 
facilitates the adoption of more efficient (and cleaner) technologies of production,  increased competition 
could trigger a race to the bottom on environmental standards, favoring the adoption of cheaper or dirtier 
technology in the short run. Nevertheless, as income grows, the demand for environmental quality tends 
to increase. The author’s proxy the technique effect by a moving average of lagged income, representing 
the slow transmission of income gains into abatement technologies. 
 
Recent works have built on the framework of Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001), but the main 
channels  and  effects  remain  similar.  For  example,  Kahn  and  Yoshino  (2004)  consider  trade  among 
different types of partners, including North-North, North-South, and South-South, and the formation of 
trading blocks. The formation of trading blocs will most likely result in a shift toward dirtier industries in 
the  middle-income  country,  which  is  moderately  capital  abundant  but  still  has  a  relatively  weak 
regulatory framework. These results reconcile the pollution haven and factor endowment hypotheses. 
 
The  relationship  between  economic  development  and  environmental  quality  has  been  extensively 
explored since Grossman and Krueger (1992) suggested an inverse-U relationship between income per 
capita and pollution, the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). Most theoretical works agree 
with the idea that economic development in low income countries is associated with industrialization and 
a consequent increase in pollution, but they present different explanations for the declining portion of the 
curve. Reasons for this inverted-U relationship include income-driven changes in (i) the composition of 
production or consumption (Selden and Song 1994; Hettige, Mani, and Wheeler 2000; Brock and Taylor 
2004);  (ii)  the  preference  for  environmental  quality  (Stokey  1998);  (iii)  institutions  dealing  with 
externalities (López 1994; Chichilnisky 1994); or (iv) increasing returns to scale associated with pollution 
abatement (Bovenberg and Smulders 1995; Stokey 1998). Among the empirical studies, results seem 
dependent on the type of pollution analyzed. 
 
Many contributions have empirically tested the existence of an EKC using cross-country relationships 
(among the others, Grossman and Krueger 1995; Stern, Common, and Barbier 1996), time-series analyses 
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for specific countries (Egli 2004), or panel data (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 2004; de Bruyn, van den 
Bergh,  and  Opschoor  1998).  While  studies  focusing  on  sulfur  dioxide,  nitrogen  oxide,  suspended 
particulates,  and  an  aggregate  measure  of  air  pollution  tend  to  support  the  existence  of  an  EKC 
(Grossman and Krueger 1992; Markandya, Golub, and Pedroso- Galinato 2006), papers studying carbon 
dioxide emissions (Aslanidis 2009) or water pollution are less conclusive (Hettige, Mani, and Wheeler 
2000).  The  EKC  may  vary  with  country-specific  characteristics,  but  studies  supporting  the  EKC 
hypothesis suggest that the turning point
5. ranges from US$2,805 (Halkos 2003) to US$9,239 (Stern and 
Common 2001) According to these studies, with the exception of Costa Rica, all countries in  Central 
America would currently be placed in transition or in the increasing part of the EKC
6. 
 
Empirical studies testing for the direct effects of trade  on  the environment are less conclusive.  For 
example,  Gamper-Rabindran  and  Jha  (2004)  empirically  analyze  the  relationship  between  trade 
liberalization and the environment in the Indian context. Their findings indicate that exports and foreign 
direct investment grew in the more-polluting sectors relative to the less-polluting sectors between the pre- 
and post-liberalization periods. Mani and Jha (2006) and  Akbostanci, Ipek Tunc, and Türüt-Asik (2004) 
find similar results for Vietnam and Turkey ,  respectively.  Dean (2002) supports  the idea that trade 
liberalization had both a direct and an indirect effect on emission growth in China and these effects could 
be opposite in sign. In contrast to this works, Grossman and Krueger (1993) found no evidence that a 
comparative advantage is being created by lax envir onmental regulations in Mexico. This result is also 
confirmed by Stern (2005), who finds only small pollution effects of NAFTA on Mexico shortly after the 
agreement, followed by an improvement in environmental quality  afterwards. Gale and Mendez (1998) 
suggests a strong link between capital abundance and pollution concentrations in production and trade 
composition even after controlling for incomes per ca pita (supposed link to the country’s regulatory 
framework).  Finally,  Melo,  Grether  and  Mathys  (2007)  measures  the  aggregate  effects  of  trade  on 
pollution taking into account a large sample of developed and developing countries. The author argue that 
contrarily to concerns raised by environmentalists, an emission-decomposition exercise shows that scale 
effects are dominated by technique effects working towards a reduction in emissions worldwide. 
 
While data and methodological issues could help to explain the differences in findings, one interesting 
pattern arises from the literature. Consistent with the predictions of Kahn and Yoshino (2004), positive 
links between international trade and pollution are more frequently identified in studies dealing with 
middle-income countries. These and a few other findings from the literature will help to guide discussion 
of the possible and expected implications of DR-CAFTA for the environment in the Central America 
economies. 
 
Possible Environmental Developments for the DR-CAFTA 
 
There  are  significant  differences  among  DR-CAFTA  countries.  Countries  differ  not  only  in  their 
regulatory environments, but also in their level of development, income, and human and physical capital 
endowments. Following the predictions of EKC theory, one would guess that, even before the agreement, 
countries were likely to be experiencing different trends with respect to pollution emissions. Both level of 
                                                           
5 Defined as the level of income per capita (purchasing power parity, PPP) beyond which emissions start to decline. 
6 Per capita GDP (US$, PPP) in 2009: Costa Rica, US$10,737; Dominican Republic, US$8,570; El Salvador, US$7,570; 
Guatemala, US$4,873; Honduras, US$4,282; Nicaragua, US$2,668. 11 
 
income and regulatory framework suggest that Costa Rica is experiencing a decline in pollution and that 
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala are in the upward-sloping stages of the EKC. El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic have intermediary income levels, but weak regulatory frameworks. These countries 
were probably approaching the turning point before the agreement. 
 
As  a  consequence  of  these  regional  disparities,  the  medium-term  environmental  implications  of  the 
agreement with the United States are likely to differ among member countries. Following the framework 
proposed by Kahn and Yoshino (2004), one would expect that, at least in the medium term, countries like 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua would tend to specialize in labor-intensive products. Despite their 
lax regulatory frameworks, these countries seem to have low comparative advantage in capital- intensive 
industries
7 (which correspond to approximately 4 percent of GDP, while the regional average is more than 
7 percent). One would expect a negative pollution trend after the agreement. The cases of the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador are less straightforward. These countries are richer than the previous group of 
countries, but they still possess weak regulatory frameworks. The two countries differ, however, in their 
level of specialization in capital-intensive sectors, with El Salvador having a significantly larger share of 
capital-intensive activities (approximately 10 percent of GDP). These characteristics make El Salvador a 
pollution haven candidate—that is, one could expect to observe higher emissions after the agreement, not 
only due to an increase in production, but also due to an increase in the share of dirty industries. Finally, 
Costa Rica combines a relatively higher degree of specialization in capital-intensive industries with a 
much stronger regulatory framework (although still weaker than that of the United States). While Costa 
Rica  would  be  likely  to  lose  dirty  industries  to  less  regulated  countries,  it  could  still  absorb  more 
sophisticated industrial activities from the United States, and the stringent regulatory framework would 
serve to check polluting activities. 
 
The next sections provide some empirical evidence by comparing the dynamics for different types of 
pollution before and after the agreement. The exercises focus on four countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. We start by decomposing the average variation in pollution content in both 
overall production and exports before and after the agreement into scale, composition, and technique 
effects. We then move to a systematic analysis of the patterns of change in the composition of both 
production and exports during the period of analysis. The formal analysis is constrained by a series of 
limitations in the data; including the lack of country-specific pollution data for the relevant period and the 
small number of observations after the DR-CAFTA (see the annex1for a detailed discussion on the data). 
Nevertheless we hope to provide an intuitive and initial quantitative assessment of the predictions offered 
above. 
 
IV.  The Empirical Analysis 
 
Ex ante one would expect that the most direct effect of trade liberalization on the environment would be 
through the composition of industries. Trade leads to specialization, and countries that specialize in less 
(more) pollution-intensive goods will have cleaner (dirtier) environments. For this reason, much of the 
literature has sought to dissect the composition effects of trade. However, the direct impacts of trade on 
environmental quality go beyond composition and can be divided into three main channels: the effects of 
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trade on the overall scale of the economy; the techniques of production, and the composition of industries. 
In  order  to  assess  these  effects  in  the  context  of  the  DR-CAFTA,  this  paper  proposes  two  simple 




Following Copeland and Taylor (2003), this exercise compares average emissions before and after the 
trade agreement. Changes in pollution are then decomposed into scale effects (changes related to scaling 
up output, keeping composition and technologies unchanged); composition effects (generated by changes 
in  sector  shares,  keeping  total  output  and  technologies  unchanged);  and  technique  effects  based  on 
technological improvements that affect emissions per unit of output according to the following equation: 
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where  t P stands for pollution in period t,  t Q  represents the total output,  jt   represents the share of output 
of industry j in total output in period t, and finally  jt p measures the emissions per  unit of output in 
industry j in period t. In addition to the comparison of pollution levels before and after the agreement, we 
consider changes in the average growth rate of pollution. This exercise accounts for existing trends in 
emissions  and  measures  whether  the  agreement  affects  these  trends.  The  decomposition  exercise  is 
developed  taking  into  account  air,  water,  metal  components,  and  the  overall  level  of  emissions.  It 
considers  emissions  resulting  from  manufacturing  production  as  well  as  the  pollution  content  of 
manufacturing exports. 
 
The data and the methodology used to construct emissions statistics implicitly assume stable technologies 
(that is, no technical effects in the period). Since technical effects are found to have a significant impact 
on the medium-term pollution outcomes, we construct an alternative pollution scenario where the average 
pollution intensity per unit of output varies with time and opening to trade (please find the details about 
the construction of the alternative scenarios in the data section).  
 
Sector Composition Exercise 
 
This exercise investigates whether trade liberalization increases the participation of pollution-intensive 
industries in production and exports. In other words, it analyzes whether the agreement promotes the 
relative growth of ―dirty‖ industries. The exercise estimates the following equation: 
 
jt jt t jt j t A j jt
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o g  and 
jt
e g  stands  for  the  growth  rate  of  outputs  and  exports,  respectively;  j D  is  a  dummy 
variable indicating ―dirty‖ industries;  t A is a dummy variable indicating the period post-negotiations; and 
jt X  is a collection of variables that can help to explain a change in composition. Regressions for the 
Central American region might also include country-specific fixed effects. Table A.1 in annex 1 presents 




The exercises focus on four Central American countries (CA4) for which data are available: Costa Rica 
(CRI), El Salvador (SVL), Honduras (HND), and Nicaragua (NIC). The study covers a 10-year period 
(1999–2008) and takes 2004 (the beginning of DR-CAFTA negotiations) as the threshold (1999–2003 = 
before; 2005–08 = after). While the ratification and beginning of implementation took place between 
2005 (for the United States) and 2007 (for Costa Rica), we believe that part of the changes in the patterns 
of production anticipate the actual ratification. Moreover, the choice of the beginning of negotiations as a 
threshold is convenient because it allows for additional observations in the post-agreement period. 
 
Annual statistics on pollution emissions are constructed using pollution intensities from the Industrial 
Pollution Projection System (IPPS) of the World Bank. This database provides information on pollution 
intensity and abatement costs at the industry level
8. More specifically,  the IPPS reports the amount of 
each of 14 pollutants, in pounds per million dollars of value added, that are generated from each of 459  
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The predicted pollution levels are constructed by 
multiplying the industry’s value added by the industry’s IPPS coefficient. Industries are then classified 
into dirty and clean industries following Mani and Wheeler (1998). Annex 4 presents a list of industries 
by category.  
 
While numerous studies use the results from IPPS for countries where data are insufficient (such as Mani 
and Jha 2006), the data have a few shortcomings. For example, IPPS takes pollution intensities in the 
United States in 1987 as the base. It represents a snapshot of the technique of production, held constant in 
a single year and place—that is, not accounting for country-specific factors or technical changes. This 
could affect the accuracy of IPPS estimates outside the United States and in different periods of time. 
However, if the intensity rankings by sector and relative magnitudes are similar across countries and time, 
IPPS can still be useful for identifying pollution problems even if it does not produce exact estimates of 
pollution. In the context of our decomposition exercise, pollution estimates based  on IPPS implicitly 
assume no technical effect. While this might be a close approximation of the very short term after the 
trade agreement, the literature shows that technique effects play a crucial role in the long run. Therefore 
IPPS based analysis taking to account long period of time are likely to be biased. For example if instead 
technical changes are such that emission per unit of value added decreases with time, we would still be 
able to estimate the composition effects, but both the scale and the overall effects would have an upward 
bias
9. 
                                                           
8 The information is available at SIC two-digit and three-digit level of disaggregation. 
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In  order  to  address  this  shortcoming,  we  propose  an  alternative  scenario  where  pollution  intensities 
change across countries and time. The scenario is constructed taking as the base the technique effects 
estimated by Grether, Mathys, and de Melo (2007) for 62 developed and developing countries during 
1990–2000.To our knowledge, this is the only study that estimates and identifies the technique effect for a 
large sample of countries
10. It does so by combining different databases providing pollution estimates at 
the country level. For most countries the data  are available only until 2000,  which prevents us from 
developing a full decomposition exercise. We circumvent the data problem by regressing  the estimate of 
Grether, Mathys, and de Melo   against  the  possible determinants of technical  changes  (please see 
regression results in the Appendix Annex 1). While initially we consider several determinants (such as 
initial per capita GDP, trade-to-GDP, manufacturing output to GDP, growth in per capita income, and 
different measures of human capital), model selection analysis  helps  us to focus on two dependent 
variables—initial GDP per capita and ratio of trade to GDP—which allows us to project the rate of 
adjustment in pollution intensity for each of the CA-4 countries in the 1999–2008 period. The rates are 
then applied to IPSS pollution intensities in order to construct new emissions data series. We assume that 
technical changes are homogeneous across sectors. 
 
The remaining data used in the analysis include the following indicators: value added, exports, imports, 
number  of  workers,  wages  of  skilled  workers,  and  wages  of  unskilled  workers.  All  indicators  are 
disaggregated at the two-digit industry level. Table A1 in the Annexappendix presents the summary 
statistics and source of each indicator. While value added and trade data are used directly in the analysis, 
labor indicators are used to calculate industry-specific factor shares. Following Grossman and Krueger 
(1992) we assume that each industry’s output is produced according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas technology using three main inputs: labor, human, and physical capital. For each industry, labor 
share is calculated as a product of average unskilled wages and total number of workers divided by 
industry output. Human capital share is calculated as the total wage bill divided by output minus the labor 
share. Finally, physical capital share is calculated as the residual. 
 
While we acknowledge potential limitations of the pollution data and the analytical framework used, we 
believe that these exercises are in line with the literature and can help to provide insights for the ongoing 
policy debate. 
 
V.  Results 
 
This section presents and discusses the results from the two quantitative exercises. In each case we start 
by discussing the benchmark case (no technique effect) and move on to the alternative scenario. We 




Figure 1 compares the emissions from clean and dirty industries in the period before and after DR-
CAFTA  assuming  no  technique  effect.  All  countries  experience  a  significant  increase  in  pollution 
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between the two periods. While for Costa Rica and El Salvador the additional emissions seem to come 
mainly from dirty industries, both type of industries played a role in the expansion  of emissions for 
Nicaragua and Honduras. A more detailed analysis is necessary to assess the extent to which the variation 
in pollution relates to changes in composition and to control for underlying trends in emissions. 
 









Source: IPPS and authors calculations 
 
Figure  2  presents  the  results  of  the  decomposition  analysis  under  the  baseline  scenario  for  total 
emissions
11 (results for air, water and metal pollution can be found in  the appendixAnnex 2). The first 
striking fact of the analysis is the importance of scale effects. More than 90 percent of pollution variation 
results from a scaling up of production. This is consistent across all countries in the sample. Composition 
effects not only  are smaller, but vary significantly across countries. For Costa Rica and El Salvador , 
composition effects further expand pollution, while for the remaining countries (including the regional 
                                                           


















































average)  composition  effects  related  to  total  emissions  and  metal  pollution  partially  compensate  the 
positive scale effect. These results go against the idea of pollution havens. Here, countries with better 
regulatory frameworks experience relative growth in emissions from dirty industries, while the opposite is 
true for countries with less stringent frameworks such as Honduras. When allowing for existing trends in 
emissions, we notice that in all countries, with the exception of Honduras, emissions increase after the 
agreement through scale effects. Nicaragua is the only country where the agreement significantly reduces 
the rate of changes in the composition of production. Emissions from manufacturing exports significantly 
increase the overall emissions and, with the exception of Honduras, the manufacture of exports becomes 
―dirtier.‖ This result probably reflects the fact that, although these economies expanded a few of the dirty 
activities  for  exports,  they  also  increased  imports  from  other  dirty  production,  reducing  domestic 
production in these segments. 
 
Figure 2. Decomposition in total emissions - Baseline 
Pollution decomposition (output) – change in levels 
 
Pollution decomposition (output)– change in rates 
 
Pollution decomposition (export) – change in levels 
 
Pollution decomposition (exports)– change in rates 
 
Source: IPPS and authors calculations 
 
Results change significantly when we allow for changes in pollution intensity. For almost all countries, 
the  technique  effect  is  the  largest  component  of  changes  in  emissions  from  production.  Under  the 
alternative scenario, the level of emissions in manufacturing production decreases steadily over time (see 
figure 3). Patterns of emissions from exports are less clear, although the technique effect plays a large 
role; the sector is still dominated by scale gains due to changes in scale in all countries but Honduras. 
When we allow for existing trends, we find only a minor expansion of pollution in production and exports 

































after the agreement. The upward pressures related to scale gains are compensated by downward pressure 
from the arrival and survival of cleaner technology. 
 
Figure 3. Decomposition in total emissions – Alternative Scenario 
Pollution decomposition (output) – change in levels 
 
Pollution decomposition (output)– change in rates 
 
Pollution decomposition (export) – change in levels 
 
Pollution decomposition (exports)– change in rates 
 
Source: IPPS and authors calculations 
 
The decomposition analysis therefore suggests that the overall direction and size of changes in emissions 
are  largely  dependent  on  assumptions  about  changes  in  technology.  Nevertheless,  some  interesting 
findings arise from the two extreme scenarios: 
 
•  Scale effects play a major role in explaining changes in emissions levels and trends after the 
agreement. 
•  Composition effects are small and vary in direction across countries. 
 
This effect is the focus of attention of the next exercise. While there seems to be no strong evidence 
supporting the pollution haven hypothesis in Central America, the exercise shows significant gains from 
the adoption of cleaner technologies. 
 
Sector Composition Exercise 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis measuring changes in the composition of outputs 
and exports, by sector, for the CA4. The results indicate a positive trend in the relative growth of dirty 
industries before the beginning of DR-CAFTA negotiations. The trend disappears in the period after. 





































Results are only significant when total pollution is taken into account. Other types of pollutants do not 
seem affected by the treat. Coefficients remain significant even after controlling for production factor 
shares,  which  indicates  that  the  dynamics  of  dirty  industries  go  beyond  traditional  comparative 
advantages. Results for exports follow a similar path. Dirty industry exports are expanding relative to 
other industries before the agreement, but this trend disappears after the beginning of negotiations. The 
main difference regarding the composition  of exports is the fact that, after crossing the DR-CAFTA 




The results of the regression analysis for individual countries are presented in tTable 2. We focus here on 
the  analysis  of  total  emissions.  The  results  for  other  types  of  pollutants  are  presented  in  the 
appendixAnnex 2. Results for Costa Rica indicate higher growth of output for dirty industries before the 
agreement,  but  this  trend  is  partially  canceled  after  negotiations.  As  for  Costa  Rica’s  exports,  dirty 
industries expand faster during the whole period.  Regressions for El Salvador indicate no significant 
effects of the agreement on the composition of output toward dirty industries. Growth seems to be driven 
mainly by factor shares, with human capital-intensive industries expanding relatively faster. El Salvador’s 
exports behave similarly to exports for the region, that is, the relatively higher growth of exports in dirty 
industries slows significantly after the agreement takes place. In Nicaragua, the agreement seems to have 
no impact on relatively pollution-intensive industries. During the sample period, growth favors labor-
intensive manufacturing activities. Finally, in Honduras, the agreement seems to have contributed to the 
relative growth in the output of cleaner industries. This result remains significant even after controlling 
for factor shares of production. Once more, results go against the common assumptions in the policy 
debate. 
 
Table 1: Regression Analysis: CA4
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dirty Total 0.16 0.33** 0.35** 0.38** 0.81* 1.74** 1.67* 1.34
Dirty Air 0.11 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.79 17.04* 1.86 1.71
Dirty Water 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.42 9.91 0.85 0.46
Dirty Metal -0.08 -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.75 -14.34** -2.11** -2.57**
After*Dirty Total -0.34* -0.35* -0.41* -1.75** -1.93* -1.30
After*Dirty Air -0.31 -0.33 -0.33 -17.30 -1.95 -1.67
After*Dirty Water -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -10.71 -1.14 -0.39
After*Dirty Metal 0.24 0.25 0.26 13.00 1.45 2.31
Labor share -0.09 -0.19 -0.14 -0.24 -1.62 -2.72 -2.00 -3.23
Capital share 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.10 -1.23 -1.69 -0.88 -1.00
After*Labor 0.10 0.10 0.64 0.80
After*Capital 0.06 -0.01 -0.70 -1.41
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 169 170 168 168 168 168 147 147 147 147
Country fixed y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
*,** signinficant at 10% and 5% resp.
Note: the classification into dirty industries follows Mani et. al (1998)




Overall the quantitative exercises developed in this section find no evidence to support the formation of 
pollution havens after DR-CAFTA negotiation. Annual levels of pollution seem to have increased after 
the agreement, but changes were driven mainly by the increase in production. In none of the economies 
analyzed do weak environmental regulatory frameworks seem to have played a major role in determining 
comparative advantages. Changes in the composition of production are quite small and, in some cases 
(like  Honduras),  favor  cleaner  sectors.  Nevertheless,  countries  should  continue  pursuing  their 
environmental  agenda  and  working  to  close  regulatory  gaps  among  member  countries,  as  pollution 
pressures tend to increase as economies grow. The environmental agenda should be combined with action 
to improve and sustain competitiveness in the presence of higher regulatory costs. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper analyzes the short-term and possible medium-term environmental impacts of the DR-CAFTA. 
The  paper  started  by  reviewing  DR-CAFTA’s  environmental  chapter  and  environmental  regulatory 
frameworks in member countries. It, then, revieweds the literature on Trade and the Environment and 
discusseds  the  expected  results  of  the  agreement  for  the  region.  The  paper  proposes  two  empirical 
exercises  for  assessing  the  changes  in  emissions  following  the  DR-CAFTA  negotiations.  The  first 
exercise  decomposes  the  pollution  effect  into  scale,  composition,  and  technique  effects.  The  second 
exercise  focuses  on  changes  in  the  composition  of production  and  exports  and  assesses  whether  the 
Table 2: Country Regressions
CRI HND
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dirty Total 0.64 0.34** 1.21** 1.23* 0.33** 0.51** 0.53** 0.62** Dirty Total 0.07 0.17* 0.08 1.08 -0.759 -1.005 -0.842 -1.40
After*Dirty Total -0.34* -1.13* -1.10 -0.31 -0.31 -0.47 After*Dirty Total -0.17* -0.17* -0.17* 0.492 0.49 1.60
Labor share -1.96 -1.72 -3.26* -3.17 Labor share -3.26 1.08 -8.41* -9.33*
Capital share -1.62 -1.02 -2.86* -2.96 Capital share -3.83* -4.04* -4.35 -4.27
After*Labor 0.33 -0.2 After*Labor -7.07** 7.8
After*Capital -0.22 After*Capital 0.17* -1.59
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
NIC SVL
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dirty Total -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 3.14 6.36** 0.07 -0.05 Dirty Total -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.69** 0.69** 0.68*
After*Dirty Total 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -6.45* -0.48 -0.25 After*Dirty Total -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.69* -0.69* -0.68
Labor share 0.62* 1.30** 5.81* 11.32** Labor share -16.27* -16.27* 3.08 3.08
Capital share 0.04 -0.03 -2.81** -2.83** Capital share -16.23* -16.32* 3.07 3.07
After*Labor -1.22 -11.02* After*Labor 0.02 1.00
After*Capital 0.13 0.05 After*Capital 0.04 -0.16
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
*,** signinficant at 10% and 5% resp.
Note: the classification into dirty industries follows
output growth per 2-digit ind exports growth per 2-digit ind output growth per 2-digit ind exports growth per 2-digit ind
output growth per 2-digit ind exports growth per 2-digit ind output growth per 2-digit ind exports growth per 2-digit ind20 
 
agreement favors the relative expansion of dirty industries. Two scenarios—no technical effect and a 
positive technical effect—are considered for the analysis. 
 
Results show that the environmental developments from DR-CAFTA vary significantly across member 
countries. Most results are consistent with the findings in the literature. Scale effects are positive and 
dominate the composition effects for all countries. Composition effects vary significantly across member 
countries.  While  Costa  Rica  and  El  Salvador,  countries  with  stronger  environmental  regulations, 
experience  a  small  but  positive  increase  in  pollution  as  a  result  of  changes  in  the  composition  of 
production, Nicaragua and Honduras (as well as the regional average) experience negative composition 
effects. The results indicate that factors other than a lax regulatory framework play an important role in 
determining  the  patterns  of  production  and  trade.  Results  change  after  allowing  for  adjustments  in 
pollution intensity. Under this alternative scenario, levels of emissions from production seem to have 
decreased after the agreement. The share of pollution in exports continuously expands in the alternative 
scenario as well. 
 
The findings do not suggest the existence of pollution havens in Central America. Nonetheless, countries 
should continue strengthening and homogenizing environmental rules in the region. The environmental 
agenda should be combined with an effort to improve competitiveness that helps to sustain trade in the 
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Annex 1: Data  
Table A1: Data Summary 
      Obs  Mean  Std.Dev  Souce 
CRI  exports  220  206921.6  313076.1  WITS 
output  189  1.08E+08  1.97E+08  Central Bank 
workers  204  13019.16  16937.23  ILO 
wages  141  389.6699  138.9347  ILO 
pollution intensity  220  17075.39  27409.71  IPPS 
HND  exports  198  30170.48  57582.29  WITS 
output  189  8.06E+07  1.51E+08  Central Bank 
workers  84  16390.86  29285.27  Household Surveys 
wages  84  236.7954  202.1501  Household Surveys 
pollution intensity  220  17075.39  27409.71  IPPS 
NIC  exports  198  18320.74  59641.4  WITS 
output  190  1.19E+08  3.20E+08  Central Bank 
workers  111  2408.045  4775.783  Household Surveys 
wages  111  2404.347  1239.8  Household Surveys 
pollution intensity  220  17075.39  27409.71  IPPS 
SVL  exports  220  53119.83  85675.62  WITS 
output  170  2.59E+08  3.34E+08  Central Bank 
workers  146  13620.19  29462.05  Household Surveys 
wages  154  197.7416  38.57555  Household Surveys 
pollution intensity  220  17075.39  27409.71  IPPS 
 
Estimating the rate of changes in pollution intensities. 
Technical changes, defined here as changes in pollution intensity, are estimated based on the work of 
Grether,  Mathys,  and  de  Melo  (2007).  This  is  one  of  the  few  articles  in  the  literature  that  identify 
technical effects in emissions changes for a large set of countries. The authors focus on changes in sulfur 
dioxide  for  the  period  1990–2000.  Given  the  lack  of  more  comparable  alternatives,  we  extend  their 
measure to the pollutants studied here. We regress the annual changes in intensity estimated by Grether, 
Mathys, and de Melo (2007) against a list of variables that could potentially affect technical changes in 
pollution
12.  Initially we consider a large set of variables (including per capita GDP, trade -to-GDP, FDI-
to-GDP, Share of manufacturing output, per capita income growth, trade -to-GDP growth, proxies for 
                                                           
12 Initially we consider a large set of variables, including per capita GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, ratio of foreign direct investment 
to GDP, share of manufacturing output, per capita income growth, ratio of trade to GDP growth, proxies for human capital, 
average year of schooling, secondary education attendance, and tertiary education attendance. 25 
 
human capital -average year of schooling, secondary education attendance, tertiary education attendance). 
But  after  trying  different  specifications,  we  identify  the  best  model  as  the  parsimonious  regression 
presented in the text. Table A2 presents the results. Estimated coefficients are then used to construct rates 
of technical changes for Central America between 1999 and 2008. 
 
Table A2: Technique Effect Regression 
 
Coef.  t  P>|t| 
GDP per capita  -2.69E-06  -1.96  0.055 
Trade-to-GDP  -0.00197  -0.09  0.932 
const  0.031664  1.3  0.2 
 




Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (exports -percent)
CA4
Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp
avg rate before 3.32 0.21 4.72 0.10 2.94 0.07 11.85 0.14 -2.98 0.31 -4.01 -0.06 -2.43 0.49 -4.16 0.30
avg rate after 5.71 -0.01 7.69 -0.03 5.02 0.01 17.53 0.04 10.95 0.33 14.18 0.01 9.38 0.22 12.38 0.10
avg all 4.28 0.05 5.87 0.02 3.77 0.02 13.88 0.06 3.79 0.48 4.80 -0.01 3.27 0.37 3.95 0.20
before/ after 
levels 21.23 0.02 28.45 -0.15 18.50 0.17 67.28 -0.28 35.97 2.21 46.41 2.36 28.55 0.35 47.48 1.02
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (exports -percent)
CRI
Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp
avg rate before -0.95 0.29 -1.20 0.34 -0.74 0.27 -3.15 0.54 -6.38 0.33 -8.26 -0.04 -5.49 0.87 -9.64 0.50
avg rate after 9.00 0.35 11.03 -0.05 7.09 0.16 20.40 0.22 11.04 0.38 14.35 -0.05 9.26 0.02 16.52 0.13
avg all 3.92 0.28 4.80 0.13 3.09 0.19 8.66 0.33 1.69 0.69 2.21 -0.02 1.38 0.50 2.36 0.35
before/ after 
levels 18.53 0.34 23.12 0.50 14.31 0.77 58.36 1.25 37.86 5.65 48.87 4.39 30.16 0.76 63.71 2.67
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (exports -percent)
HND
Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp
avg rate before 27.71 0.02 35.98 -0.43 25.45 -0.07 70.27 0.17 -5.58 0.84 -6.80 -0.38 -4.14 -0.09 -7.38 0.32
avg rate after 9.89 0.07 12.77 0.11 9.78 0.04 22.85 0.14 19.77 5.07 27.39 2.87 17.43 2.13 20.32 1.01
avg all 16.81 0.04 21.80 -0.14 15.76 -0.01 41.63 0.14 7.06 2.63 10.12 1.11 6.51 0.91 6.45 0.59
before/ after 
levels 36.75 -1.48 47.53 -0.48 34.41 -0.14 87.99 -0.77 47.54 -5.13 65.85 0.44 38.10 -0.41 49.54 -0.47
water metal
total air water metal
total air water metal
total air
total air water metal
total air water metal






   
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (exports -percent)
NIC
Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp
avg rate before -2.30 0.53 -3.89 0.22 -2.43 0.07 -14.11 0.16 6.89 0.07 12.13 -0.02 7.32 1.18 3.76 0.10
avg rate after 8.47 -0.47 14.60 -0.44 9.29 -0.26 55.64 -0.81 18.60 -0.57 33.89 -0.28 18.47 -0.10 11.25 -0.09
avg all 3.22 -0.05 5.55 -0.12 3.52 -0.10 21.21 -0.36 12.95 -0.22 23.29 -0.14 13.01 0.48 7.90 0.00
before/ after 
levels 22.97 -0.37 39.50 -1.41 24.00 -0.59 140.54 -6.31 37.13 1.46 63.97 0.81 37.40 0.68 26.22 0.35
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (exports -percent)
SVL
Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp Scale Comp
avg rate before 2.46 0.07 3.09 0.05 2.10 -0.03 7.08 -0.09 2.41 0.07 2.67 0.03 1.72 0.08 2.93 0.05
avg rate after 3.48 0.07 4.38 0.08 2.90 0.06 10.64 0.11 9.84 -0.46 11.38 -0.34 8.02 0.56 9.78 0.00
avg all 2.83 0.02 3.56 0.04 2.38 -0.01 8.42 -0.02 6.43 -0.20 7.37 -0.15 5.07 0.26 6.70 0.00
before/ after 
levels 18.46 0.34 23.17 -0.01 15.72 0.15 51.42 0.34 27.54 -0.28 31.13 -0.14 20.23 -0.07 32.35 -0.11
total air water metal
total air water metal total air water metal
total air water metal
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (export - percent)
CA4
Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec
avg before 0.53 0.01 -0.36 5.26 0.02 -6.49 3.21 0.13 -3.08 13.70 0.13 -13.11 4.92 0.25 -6.32 -3.11 -0.05 5.29 -1.87 0.41 0.25 -3.21 0.24 1.75
avg after 0.80 0.00 -0.06 7.69 -0.02 -5.88 5.02 0.01 -4.35 17.48 -0.01 -17.04 8.47 0.07 -7.29 11.51 -0.08 -11.01 7.64 0.19 -8.37 9.68 0.04 -10.53
avg all 0.63 0.00 -0.17 6.11 0.00 -5.43 3.89 0.05 -3.49 14.68 0.03 -14.06 6.36 0.29 -6.11 4.06 -0.05 -4.57 2.78 0.31 -3.94 3.22 0.14 -4.26
before/after 8.05 0.04 -12.77 10.78 -0.07 -15.41 6.99 0.05 -11.79 25.95 -0.14 -30.47 12.22 0.75 -17.32 15.51 0.71 -20.64 9.65 0.11 -14.27 15.81 0.32 -19.89
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (export - percent)
CRI
Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec
avg before -0.95 0.59 0.19 -1.20 0.11 0.87 -0.74 0.32 0.19 -3.15 0.46 2.84 -6.37 3.60 3.36 -8.37 1.93 6.96 -5.53 0.59 5.74 -9.62 1.26 8.56
avg after 9.00 0.32 -8.68 11.04 -0.05 -10.29 7.09 0.16 -6.60 20.36 0.08 -19.25 11.05 0.08 -9.92 14.31 0.12 -13.30 9.26 0.06 -7.99 16.50 0.11 -15.03
avg all 3.92 0.40 -4.09 4.80 0.02 -4.58 3.09 0.21 -3.09 8.64 0.24 -8.16 1.70 1.68 -2.47 2.15 0.93 -2.21 1.36 0.42 -0.74 2.36 0.75 -2.13
before/after 5.85 0.11 -11.55 7.27 0.16 -12.99 4.52 0.24 -10.44 18.64 0.40 -23.01 12.27 1.84 -18.41 15.91 1.43 -21.71 9.87 0.25 -14.51 20.33 0.85 -25.01
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (export - percent)
HND
Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec
avg before 2.34 -0.92 -1.66 3.01 -0.31 -2.99 2.19 0.11 -2.65 5.67 -0.32 -5.24 -5.57 -1.06 5.98 -6.82 -0.39 6.67 -4.15 0.15 3.40 -7.38 0.16 7.13
avg after 9.91 0.31 -9.29 12.76 0.05 -11.97 9.78 0.12 -8.80 22.86 0.04 -22.20 16.17 1.76 -18.58 22.43 1.44 -24.74 14.26 0.96 -15.62 15.84 -0.83 -16.77
avg all 5.95 -0.19 -5.36 7.66 -0.09 -7.20 5.82 0.10 -5.57 13.82 -0.10 -13.28 5.46 0.31 -6.15 7.90 0.47 -8.79 5.09 0.49 -5.81 4.46 -0.30 -4.87
before/after 8.01 -0.32 -14.31 10.35 -0.10 -16.86 7.45 -0.03 -14.23 19.39 -0.17 -25.67 9.43 -1.02 -15.77 13.08 0.09 -20.48 7.56 -0.08 -14.95 9.99 -0.09 -17.17
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (export - percent)
NIC
Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec
avg before -2.30 -0.16 2.25 -3.89 0.35 3.37 -2.43 0.19 2.23 -14.11 0.35 13.81 6.94 0.71 -6.54 12.24 1.50 -12.60 7.34 0.67 -6.63 3.75 0.28 -3.00
avg after 8.47 -0.57 -6.69 14.56 -0.27 -13.04 9.31 -0.28 -7.95 55.59 -0.81 -53.71 18.57 0.11 -17.00 33.86 0.11 -32.24 18.60 -0.65 -15.74 11.23 0.01 -10.33
avg all 3.21 -0.34 -2.36 5.53 0.01 -5.02 3.54 -0.09 -2.94 21.19 -0.36 -20.35 12.96 0.36 -11.85 23.33 0.71 -22.54 13.07 0.01 -11.26 7.89 0.13 -6.85
before/after 9.83 -0.16 -13.66 16.98 -0.61 -20.37 10.34 -0.26 -14.30 60.68 -2.71 -62.30 16.45 0.65 -20.61 28.36 0.36 -32.43 16.58 0.30 -19.96 11.63 0.15 -15.48
Change in pollution (output- percent) Change in pollution (export - percent)
SVL
Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec Scale Comp Tec
avg before 2.46 -0.11 -2.17 3.09 -0.08 -2.83 2.10 -0.01 -1.91 7.09 0.01 -6.57 2.41 0.07 -2.38 2.67 0.03 -2.66 1.73 0.08 -1.84 2.93 0.08 -2.42
avg after 3.48 0.10 -3.11 4.37 0.06 -3.95 2.91 0.05 -2.45 10.64 0.10 -10.86 9.84 0.80 -9.06 11.36 0.73 -10.69 8.00 0.14 -6.40 9.76 0.01 -8.15
avg all 2.83 -0.01 -2.49 3.56 -0.01 -3.21 2.38 0.00 -2.03 8.42 0.02 -8.07 6.42 0.35 -5.91 7.36 0.32 -6.88 5.06 0.08 -4.28 6.68 0.03 -5.51
before/after 8.38 0.15 -12.38 10.49 -0.01 -14.36 7.08 0.07 -10.90 23.48 0.15 -27.82 12.40 -0.12 -15.97 14.03 -0.06 -17.80 9.10 -0.03 -13.11 14.74 -0.05 -17.09
water metal
water metal
total air water metal
water metal
total air water metal




total air water metal
total air water metal
total air water metal
total air water metal27 
 
Annex 3: Regression Analysis for Individual Countries 
  
 
   
Regression Analysis: CRI
Dependent variable: annual output growth per 2-digit industry Dependent variable: annual exports growth per 2-digit industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dirty Total 0.64 0.34** 1.21** 1.25* 0.33** 0.51** 0.53** 0.62**
Dirty Air 0.58 1.18 1.17 1.15 0.39** 0.50* 0.50* 0.51*
Dirty Water 0.34 0.66 0.64 0.58 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.30
Dirty Metal -0.49 -0.95* -0.96 -1.03 -0.38** -0.52** -0.52** -0.48*
After*Dirty Total -0.34* -1.13* -1.20 -0.31 -0.31 -0.47
After*Dirty Air -1.19 -1.20 -1.16 -0.21 -0.21 -0.23
After*Dirty Water -0.63 -0.64 -0.52 -0.24 -0.24 -0.30
After*Dirty Metal 0.92 0.93 1.06 0.25 0.25 0.18
Labor share -1.96 -1.56 -2.11 -1.72 -3.26* -2.88* -3.17 -2.80
Capital share -1.62 -1.14 -1.66 -1.02 -2.86* -2.41 -2.96 -2.47
After*Labor 0.31 0.33 -0.2 -0.16
After*Capital 0.07 -0.22 0.2 0.12
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Regression Analysis: HND
Dependent variable: annual output growth per 2-digit industry Dependent variable: annual exports growth per 2-digit industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dirty Total 0.07 0.17* 0.08 0.02 -0.76 -1.00 -0.84 -1.40
Dirty Air -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 -0.34
Dirty Water -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.51 -0.73 -0.69 -1.19
Dirty Metal 0.11* 0.19** 0.11 0.04 -1.42 -1.49 -1.65 -2.27*
After*Dirty Total -0.17* -0.17* -0.07 0.49 0.49 1.60
After*Dirty Air 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.55
After*Dirty Water 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.45 0.45 1.45
After*Dirty Metal -0.14* -0.14 -0.02 0.15 0.15 1.39
Labor share -3.26 -3.33 0.72 1.08 -8.41* -10.60** -9.33* -10.81**
Capital share -3.83* -3.93* -3.96* -4.04* -4.35 -5.74* -4.27 -5.67*
After*Labor -6.37** -7.07** 7.79 3.40
After*Capital 0.21** 0.17* -1.59 -2.14*
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Regression Analysis: NIC
Dependent variable: annual output growth per 2-digit industry Dependent variable: annual exports growth per 2-digit industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dirty Total -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 3.14 6.36** 0.07 -0.05
Dirty Air -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 2.97 6.09 -0.24 -0.26
Dirty Water -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 1.66 3.62 0.01 -0.03
Dirty Metal 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.09 -2.67 -4.96* 0.00 -0.14
After*Dirty Total 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -6.45* -0.48 -0.25
After*Dirty Air 0.07 0.07 0.05 -6.24 -0.19 -0.15
After*Dirty Water 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -3.93 -0.04 0.04
After*Dirty Metal 0.01 0.01 -0.04 4.57 -0.25 0.03
Labor share 0.62* 0.68 1.37** 5.81* 5.20* 11.32** 10.61**
Capital share 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -2.81** -2.85** -2.83** -2.85**
After*Labor -1.25 -11.02* -10.81*
After*Capital 0.14 0.05 -0.01
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Regression Analysis: SVL
Dependent variable: annual output growth per 2-digit industry Dependent variable: annual exports growth per 2-digit industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dirty Total -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0176 0.31 0.69** 0.69** 0.68*
Dirty Air -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.30 0.68* 0.75 0.73
Dirty Water -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.40 0.36 0.30
Dirty Metal -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.28 -0.56* -0.69* -0.76*
After*Dirty Total -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.69* -0.69* -0.68
After*Dirty Air -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.69 -0.75 -0.71
After*Dirty Water -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.43 -0.43 -0.32
After*Dirty Metal 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.52 0.63 0.75
Labor share -16.27* -16.65* -16.27* -16.62* 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08
Capital share -16.23* -16.20* -16.32* -16.25* 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.09
After*Labor 0.02 -0.05 1.00 5.8
After*Capital 0.04 0.08 -0.16 -2.0
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
*,** signinficant at 10% and 5% resp.
Note: the classification into dirty industries follows28 
 
Annex 4: Ranking of Dirtiest Manufacturing Industries 
 
A conventional approach to defining dirty industries has been to identify pollution-intensive sectors as 
those that incur high levels of abatement expenditure per unit of output in the United States and other 
developed economies (Mani 1996;Tobey 1990). A more direct approach is to select sectors that rank high 
on  actual  emissions  intensity.  Mani  and  Wheeler  (1998)  determine  the  high-ranking  sectors  by  this 
criterion using emissions intensities of medium U.S. manufacturing firms at the three-digit SIC level. 
They then compute average sectoral rankings for conventional air pollutants, water pollutants, and toxic 
substances as shown in the Table A4. Similar to the conventional approach, five of the six sectors with 
the highest overall ranks are iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial chemicals, pulp and paper, and 
nonmetallic  mineral  products.  The  strength  of  their  approach  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  set  of  dirtiest 
manufacturing industries appears to be fairly stable across countries and pollutants.  
 
Table A4: Dirty Industries according to different Pollutants 
Rank  Air  Water  Toxic/Metal  Overall 
1  Iron and Steel  Iron and Steel  Non-Fer Metals  Iron and Steel 
2  Non-Fer Metals  Non-Fer Metals  Iron and Steel  Non-Fer Metals 
3  Non-Fer minerals   Pulp and paper   Industrial Chemicals  Industrial Chemicals 
4  Petro Coal Prod   Mis Minerals   Leather Products   Petro Refineries 
5  Pulp and paper   Industrial Chemicals  Pottery  Non-Fer minerals  
6  Petro Refineries  Other Chemicals  Metal Products  Pulp and paper  
7  Industrial Chemicals  Beverages  Rubber Products  Other Chemicals 
8  Other Chemicals  Food Products  Electrical Products  Rubber Products 
9  Wood Products  Rubber Products  Machinery  Leather Products  
10  Glass Products  Petro Products  Non- Metal Minerals  Metal products 
Source: Mani and Wheeler (1998) 